耕地保护政策与地方政府土地出让行为

Farmland Protection and Land Leasing Behavior of Local Governments

在粮食安全战略的宏观背景下,中国实行最严格的"18亿亩耕地红线"保护政策,但耕地保护政策的经济影响尚缺乏充分的量化评估。文章结合地市级统计数据和遥感地理信息数据,运用双重差分法,重点考察耕地保护政策如何改变地方政府土地出让的数量和来源结构以及对地块容积率、施工时间、招拍挂比例等微观行为特征的影响。实证分析指出,通过降低新增建设用地中耕地转用的比例,"耕地红线"政策显著抑制了建设用地和新增建设用地的出让规模。在非市辖区和"低级土地"中,这一政策效应更为明显。进一步利用土地交易微观数据分析表明,政策约束倒逼地方政府提高了地块容积率和招拍挂比例,并缩短了施工时间,这有利于提高土地利用效率。但是,政策冲击对地方政府财政收入产生了一定负面影响。文章系统分析了耕地保护政策对地方政府土地出让的影响,旨在为耕地保护政策的相关讨论提供实证证据,并为未来统筹协调粮食安全战略和土地市场化改革提供政策参考。

For the purpose of food security, China implements a stringent system of farmland protection-the “1.8 Billion Mu(120 Million Hectares) Red Line of Farmland”. The economic impact of the “Red Line Policy”(RLP) has not been studied enough using quantitative analysis. Combining prefecture data, micro land transaction data and remote sensing data, this paper empirically analyzes how the policy affects the scale, source, and characteristics of local governments’ land leasing by the DID method. It demonstrates that the RLP significantly restrains the scale of construction land leasing, especially the incremental construction land(ICL) leasing, through the channel of decreasing the ratio of ICL transferred from farmland. The policy effect is larger in the subsamples of non-city-district and low-level land. The quantity constraint encourages local governments to raise required floor area ratios, increase market-based leasing and shorten construction time, which are conducive to improving land use efficiency, but may also have a certain negative impact on local public finance.This paper may have the following contributions:(1) Given the dual urban-rural structure of land ownership in China, we demonstrate that a quantity constraint on farmland in rural areas can decrease the land leasing scale in urban areas, through the mechanism of reducing the percentage of new construction land transferred from farmland, which used to be a major source.(2) We discuss how the farmland protection policy changes the micro behaviors of local governments’ land leasing, including locations, leasing requirements and land use efficiency.(3) It deepens our understanding of how local governments balance between the trade-off of central-government regulations and local economic incentives.(4) Based on the results, we attempt to give several suggestions on how to improve the land regulation policy in China.