医联体下医疗服务供应链创新激励机制与协调研究

Research on innovation incentive mechanism and coordination of medical service supply chain under Medical Cluster

从委托代理角度探究政府、社区医院对综合医院的合作服务努力水平和服务能力的激励机制决策分析。研究结果表明,单一非对称信息下双重激励机制既可以减少政府的激励成本,也有效提高了综合医院的合作服务努力水平;双重非对称信息下政府激励机制可以有效甄选出最优合作服务能力的综合医院,同时又能够使其提高自身合作服务努力水平,为医联体下政府对综合医院的激励机制及社区医院对综合医院的合作模式提供参考。

From the perspective of the principal-agent,this paper explores the decision-making analysis of incentive mechanisms of government and community hospitals to the cooperative service effort level and service ability of general hospitals.The results show that the double incentive mechanism under single asymmetric information can not only reduce the incentive cost of the government but also effectively improve the cooperative service level of general hospitals.The government incentive mechanism under dual asymmetric information can effectively select the general hospitals with the best cooperative service capacity,and at the same time make them improve their cooperative service level,which provides reference for the government incentive mechanism for general hospitals under medical union and the cooperation mode between community hospitals and general hospitals.