ICSID仲裁制度商事化设计的路径依赖

Path Dependence of Commercial Design of ICSID Arbitration System

ICSID仲裁是国际投资治理中重要的争端解决机制。路径依赖理论为厘清ICSID仲裁的商事化设计提供了理论视角。作为单一的国际投资争端解决机制,《ICSID公约》是在二战后大规模国有化运动、投资者母国与东道国矛盾激化背景下,各国政府间和国际组织在经历多次多边投资立法失败情形下创设的。世界银行倡导的《ICSID公约》是对早期国际投资商事仲裁实践的总结,是此前历史演化过程中传承下来的国际争端解决方式。ICSID仲裁的商事化制度设计虽然并非最优,但在时间序列上占据优势,并在国际投资治理中与其他商事仲裁机构实现"协调效应"以及投资者、国家的"适应性预期",强化了ICSID仲裁商事化的特质。

ICSID arbitration is an important dispute settlement mechanism in international investment governance. The theory of historical institutionalism provides a theoretical perspective for clarifying the commercial design of ICSID arbitration. As a single international investment dispute settlement mechanism,the "ICSID Convention" was created in the context of the large-scale nationalization movement after World War II and the intensification of contradictions between the investor’s home country and the host country. Intergovernmental and international organizations have experienced multiple failures in multilateral investment legislation. of. The "ICSID Convention" advocated by the World Bank is a summary of early international investment and commercial arbitration practices is an international dispute settlement method that has been passed down during the previous historical evolution. Although the design of the commercial system of ICSID arbitration is not optimal,it has advantages in time series and continuously strengthens itself in international investment governance,which makes investors and the country have "path dependence" on it.