理解逻辑后承多元论

Making Sense of Pluralism about Logical Consequence

主张逻辑的多元性,是一个极具争议的逻辑哲学立场。后承多元论是近来最为显著的逻辑多元论学说,它主张逻辑的多元性来自逻辑后承的多元性。本文首先考虑并排除了两类典型的针对逻辑多元论的整体性反驳;其次阐述了直觉性的、非形式的后承概念的未确定性,以及毕奥和雷斯托尔以此为动机所提出的后承多元论;然后考虑了这个理论的一个直接但饱受质疑的结果,即存在两个不同的经典逻辑后承,尤其说明这个结果在处理逻辑哲学难题时的用处;最后再次回到后承概念的未确定性,探讨了对它的两种理解:含混性和歧义性。

It is a controversial standpoint in philosophy of logic to claim logical pluralism.Pluralism about logical consequence,which claims that the plurality of logic results from the plurality of logical consequence,is the most prominent theory in recent years.In this paper,we first consider and exclude two kinds of typical holistic refutations against logical pluralism.Secondly,we expound the unsettledness of informal and pretheoretical notion of consequence,as well as the pluralism proposed and defended by JC Beall and Greg Restall.Then,we consider a direct but questionable result of this theory,that is,there are two different classical consequences.In particular,we explain the use of this result in dealing with some puzzled problems in philosophy of logic.Finally,we go back to the unsettled conception of consequence,and its two sorts of understanding:vagueness and ambiguity.