政府和快递包装供应商在绿色技术创新中的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government and Express Packaging Supplier in Green Technology Innovation

建立政府和快递包装供应商之间的演化博弈模型,分析两者在绿色技术创新中的演化稳定策略,对参数赋值后用Matlab进行数值仿真。结果表明:政府监管时获得的社会收益及监管成本是影响其行为的关键因素;快递包装供应商进行绿色技术创新的增量收益和增量成本是影响其策略的关键因素,加大政府监管和补贴可以促进快递包装供应商进行绿色技术创新,但政府补贴并非越多越好。最后,从加强政府监管、促进快递包装供应商绿色技术创新动力等方面提出建议。

In this paper,we established an evolutionary game model between the government and an express packaging supplier,analyzed the evolutionary stability strategy of the two in green technology innovation,and used Matlab for numerical simulation after parameter assignment.The result showed that:the social benefits and regulatory costs happening under government supervision were the key factors affecting the behavior of the government;the incremental benefits and costs of green technology innovation by the express packaging supplier were the key factors affecting its decision-making;and though government supervision and subsidization could promote green technology innovation by the express packaging supplier,higher government subsidy was not necessarily more desirable.Finally,we put forward some suggestions on strengthening government supervision and motivating the express packaging supplier in making greater efforts in green technology innovation.