考虑责任违规中断的负责任采购博弈

A Responsible Sourcing Game Considering Interruption Due to Violation

随着全球供应链的发展,供应商过程违规越来越成为供应中断的常见原因。为改善过程合规性,很多跨国公司已经在全球范围内,尤其是发展中国家实施负责任采购。针对供应商-采购方过程行为建模内生化责任违规中断风险,构建采购方和风险供应商之间的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究订货比例、成本结构等对决策产生的影响。通过比较静态分析发现,在责任违规中断风险下,即使跨国公司的订单占比较小,风险供应商也有动力不断提高合规水平直至完全合规。这说明跨国公司可通过游说当地政府提高对过程违规行为的监管和惩罚,以此激励风险供应商提高合规努力。

With the development of the global supply chain system,process violations on the part of suppliers are becoming increasingly more a cause of supply disruption.To improve process compliance,many multinational companies have begun to implement responsible sourcing on a global scale,especially from developing countries.By modeling the supplier-purchaser process behavior,this paper endogenized the interruption risk in the supply chain due to non-compliance or violation,and built the Stackelberg game model between the purchaser and the risky supplier to look at the impact of order ratio and cost structure on the decision-making in the supply chain.Through static comparison,it was found that under the risk of interruption due to violation,even where multinational companies accounted for only a small proportion of their orders,risk suppliers had the motivation to continuously improve their level of compliance until full compliance.This suggests that multinational companies can incentivize risky suppliers to improve their compliance efforts by lobbying local governments for tighter regulation and penalties over process violations.