石里克的认识论取向论析

On Schlick’s Epistemological Orientation

石里克提出“意识的统一性”这一术语,不仅将它作为主体形成完整表象的前提,还将它解释为批判康德先验自我意识的根源,由此将其认识论与康德认识论区分开来。康德的认识论肯定概念的普遍性和判断在知识表达中的关键地位,使得有必要从概念和判断两个方面解析石里克的认识论取向。通过区分概念和意象,石里克拒绝康德所谓的纯粹概念,他肯定概念与判断密切相关,认识到有些判断不能带来知识;在对于知识判断之真的探索中,石里克不仅以配列的“一义性”替代真理符合论,还给出一个拒斥先天综合判断的经验论立场。石里克关于认识存在、来源及其辩护的思想注重语言分析,但是,其逻辑经验主义预设经典逻辑和亚氏范畴理论,使得其经验论成为一个有问题的认识论取向。

Schlick puts forward the term“unity of consciousness”,which not only takes it as the premise for the subject to form a complete representation,but also interprets it as the source of criticizing Kant’s transcendental self-consciousness,thus distinguishing his epistemology from Kant’s epistemology.Kant’s epistemology affirms the universality of concept and the key position of judgment in knowledge expression,which makes it necessary to analyze Schlick’s epistemological orientation from two aspects of concept and judgment.By distinguishing concept from image,Schlick rejects Kant’s so-called pure concept,affirms that concept is closely related to judgment,and realizes that some judgments can not bring knowledge;in the exploration of the truth of knowledge judgment,Schlick not only substitutes the theory of truth correspondence with the“monosemy”of collocation,but also gives an empiricism position of rejecting the congenital comprehensive judgment.Schlick’s thoughts on the existence,origin and defense of cognition focus on language analysis.However,his logical empiricism presupposes classical logic and Aristotle’s category theory,which makes his empiricism a problematic epistemological orientation.