高管团队薪酬粘性、内部控制与创新绩效关系的研究

Research on the Relationship Between Executive Team Salary Stickiness, Internal Control and Innovation Performance

高管薪酬被认为是研究人力资源与开发的一个重要课题,对企业业绩、声誉等方面会产生直接或间接的影响。因此,选取2011—2019年沪市A股的上市企业作为研究对象,以探究高管团队薪酬粘性与创新绩效间的关系。根据委托代理理论,拥有经营权的高管的薪酬在整个企业发展进程中仍与自身及团队所创造的绩效尤其是创新绩效挂钩,并且其存在的粘性特性会产生重要作用。另外,高管团队薪酬粘性与创新绩效的关系也并非一成不变,也会受到内部控制等方面的影响,并以此提出假设。通过研究发现,两者是存在负相关关系的,并且在内部控制的调节下对两者之间的关系起到了增强作用。

Executive compensation is considered to be an important topic in the study of human resources and development, which will have a direct or indirect impact on enterprise performance and reputation. Therefore, the listed companies of Shanghai A-share market from 2011 to2019 are selected as the research object to explore the relationship between executive team salary stickiness and innovation performance. According to the principal-agent theory, the salary of executives with management rights is still linked to the performance created by themselves and their team, especially the innovation performance, and its stickiness will play an important role. In addition, the relationship between executive team salary stickiness and innovation performance is not invariable, and will also be affected by internal control, so as to put forward assumptions. Through the research, it is found that there is a negative correlation between the two, and the relationship between them has been enhanced under the regulation of internal control.