两种永恒与两种幸福——论《尼各马可伦理学》的两种幸福问题

Two Notions of Eternity and Two Notions of Eudaemonia:On Two Notions of Eudaemonia in The Nicomachean Ethics

在针对《尼各马可伦理学》"两种幸福"问题的以往讨论中,大都将焦点集中在幸福概念本身,在此基础上对两种生活方式展开分析和阐释。这些尝试均未触及问题产生的根源,因而无法指出问题的实质。《尼各马可伦理学》以《灵魂论》为理论基础,二者是功能论证的一个整体,这个问题的答案需要从后者之中寻求。幸福是"属人的善",《灵魂论》中对灵魂和肉体在人之构成中的地位的讨论直接影响到"属人"的内涵,进而决定了人生终极目的和"属人的善",前者在《灵魂论》中表现为两种永恒,后者在《尼各马可伦理学》中以两种幸福的形式出现。两种幸福问题是两种永恒的延续。

In the previous discussions of the two notions of eudaemonia in The Nicomachean Ethics, most of them focused on the concept of eudaemonia itself, then analyzed and explained the two lifestyles. None of them attempted to discuss the root cause of the problem and therefore, the essence of the problem was left undiscovered. The Nicomachean Ethics takes On the Soul as its theoretical basis, the two forming a whole of functional argumentation, whose answer can be found in the latter. Eudaemonia is “human goodness”. The discussion of the status of the soul and the body in the composition of the human in On the Soul directly affects the connotation of “human property”, which in turn determines the ultimate goal of life and “human goodness”. The former appears in the form of two notions of eternity in On the Soul, while the latter appears in the form of two notions of eudaemonia in The Nicomachean Ethics. The two notions of eudaemonia are a continuation of the two notions of eternity.