广告盈利模式下网购平台间的竞争对其质量管控力度的影响

How Competition among Online Shopping Platforms Affects Their Quality Integrity Supervision in Advertising Profit Model

当前网购市场中的假冒伪劣现象备受社会关注,作为网购供应链的核心主体,网购平台企业应承担相应质量管控义务。既有文献对平台企业的质量管控进行了有益的探索,文章在此基础之上,探讨广告收入为网购平台主要营收来源时,两个不同规模平台企业间的竞争对其质量管控力度的影响。在双边市场理论框架下,通过构建博弈模型得到如下结果:随着网购平台之间竞争程度的增加,或随着网购平台之间广告宣传替代性的增强,或随着进驻网购平台在线商家数量的增多,每个平台企业均会提高质量管控力度;两个平台企业的质量管控力度随着在线消费者对广告厌恶度的增加均呈倒U型变化趋势。

The counterfeit and shoddy in the online shopping market is widely concerned by the society at present.As the core of the online shopping market,online shopping platform enterprises should undertake some quality integrity supervision obligations.In present literature online shopping platforms in quality supervision have been explored.Based on this,the article explores the impact of competition between two online shopping platforms on their quality supervision when the advertising revenue is the main profit model of online shopping platforms.By establishing a dynamic game model based on the two-sided market theory we obtain the following research conclusions.With the increase of competition between online shopping platforms,or with the increase of advertising substitution between online shopping platforms,or with the increase of the number of online merchants registered on online shopping platforms,platform enterprises will increase their quality control efforts;With the increase of consumers’boredom with advertising,the quality control of platform enterprises shows an inverted U-shaped change trend.