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论我国标准必要专利禁令救济的适用和完善 被引量:1

Research on the Application and Perfection of the Standard Essential Patents Injunctive Relief
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摘要 标准必要专利由于具有一定的公共属性,以及为警惕专利劫持和反向劫持,其在适用禁令救济时有其特殊性:标准必要专利不应当适用禁令救济;FRAND声明不排除禁令救济的适用。本文通过分析美国和欧盟对于标准必要专利禁令救济的相关政策和学术观点认为:适用上虽由于专利体制的不同采用了不同的规则,但本质上是平衡SEP权利人和实施者的利益平衡,促进双方诚信协商,因此可以为我国司法实践提供参考。而我国目前用过错来作为SEP禁令救济的考虑因素在当前是适当的,但可借鉴域外经验将公共利益和利益平衡原则考虑其中,对双方过错的具体考虑因素禁令完善,并且在规则适用上更加灵活。 As standard essential patents have certain public attributes,and to guard against patent hijacking and reverse hijacking,they have their particularities when applying injunctive relief:standard essential patents should not apply injunctive relief,while FRAND principle does not exclude the application of injunctive relief.Based on the relevant policies and academic views on injunctive relief for standard essential patents in the United States and the European Union,it’s argued that although varying rules have been adopted due to distinctions in the patent system,the essence is to balance the interests of patents owners and executors,and to promote amicable negotiation between the two sides,therefore,it can provide reference for the judicial practice in China.At present,it is appropriate to take fault into consideration for injunctive relief,it’s also advised to draw on extraterritorial experience and take into account the principle of public interest and the balance of interests,perfect the considerations for the fault of both parties,in order to promote the flexible application of the rules.
作者 杨楠 Yang Nan(School of Intellectual Property,East China University of Political Science and Law,Shanghai 200042)
出处 《中阿科技论坛(中英文)》 2022年第2期170-174,共5页 China-Arab States Science and Technology Forum
关键词 标准必要专利 禁令救济 专利劫持 反向劫持 Standard essential patents Injunctive relief Patent hijacking Reverse hijacking
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二级参考文献90

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