道德存有路线的展开——儒家生生伦理学对明道历史贡献的新判定

The Unfolding of the Lineage of Moral Existence:A New Determination of the Historical Contribution of Ming Dao from Shengsheng Ethics of Confucianism

两千多年儒学的发展实际有一主一辅两条线索:主线为道德践行问题,这是自孔子创立儒学之始就有的;辅线为道德存有问题,这是受佛教影响到宋代之后渐渐形成的。明道的历史贡献,除了提出天理概念,开辟心学方向外,还表现在道德存有方面。其"仁者浑然与物同体"的思想,正式展开了道德存有的路线,使儒家道德践行和道德存有这一主一辅两条线索的整体格局具有了雏形;而"物不能推,人则能推"的论述更包含着建构道德存有的主体只能是人,不能是天的深刻意蕴。对于明道的道德存有论,学界多有不同的理解,而分歧的焦点之一,是如何界定创生道德存有那个主体的性质。这个问题关系甚大,亟待深入讨论。

The development of Confucianism in the past two thousand years has two clues: the main line is the problem of moral practice, which has existed since Confucius founded Confucianism;the auxiliary line is the problem of moral existence, which was gradually formed after the Song Dynasty under the influence of Buddhism. Ming Dao not only introduces the principle of heaven and opens up the direction of the study of heart, but also embodies in the area of moral existence. After Heng Qu, Ming Dao’s idea of "a benevolent person is in harmony with things" formally unfolds the lineage of moral existence, giving shape to the overall pattern of Confucian moral practice and moral existence as one main and one subsidiary threads. The statement that "things cannot extend themselves, but human can"contains the profound implication that the subject of constructing moral existence can only be human, not heaven.There are many different understandings about the moral being theory, and one of the focus is how to treat the nature of the subject of the creation of moral being.