摘要
随着国家政策的放开,保险公司持股上市企业的现象剧增,保险机构投资者逐渐成为中国资本市场中的重要角色,对企业经营决策发挥了重大作用。在此背景下,本文考察了险资入市对企业创新活动的影响。研究发现:一方面,保险机构投资者持股公司的研发投入和专利产出更少;另一方面,保险机构投资者持股公司的CEO强制变更概率更高,经营业绩更差。本文还讨论了保险公司影响企业创新背后的理论机理。本文研究表明,险资持股带来了过度监督效应,抑制了企业创新。本文有助于市场加深对保险机构的认识,丰富企业创新的相关研究,为改善公司治理提供建议。保险机构投资者是中国资本市场改革的重要力量,政府监管部门需合理引导保险机构投资者,使其发挥积极的外部治理作用。
As the China Insurance Regulatory Commission(CIRC)relaxed restrictions on insurance funds investing in stocks,more and more insurance institutions play an important role in capital markets and affect the corporate decisions.This paper empirically examines the impact of insurance institutions’investment on firms’innovation activities.The study finds that the companies invested by insurance institutions spend less on R&D and hold fewer patents.Meanwhile,the companies invested by insurance institutions have a higher probability of CEO turnover,and worse operating performance.This paper also discusses the theory of the excessive monitoring of insurance institutions.The finding suggests the insurance institutions bring excessive monitoring effect,which impedes the innovation activities of enterprises.The paper helps to deepen the understanding of investment by insurance institutions and enrich the study of corporate innovation,and also provides recommendations for the improvement of corporate governance.Insurance institutions are a vital force in the reform of the Chinese capital market,and should be reasonably guided by regulatory agencies to perform a positive external governance effect.
作者
赖黎
玄宇豪
巩亚林
LAI Li;XUAN Yuhao;GONG Yalin(Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,611130)
出处
《财贸经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第2期128-145,共18页
Finance & Trade Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目“管理者性格特征对企业财务决策的影响--基于语言文本分析技术”(72102188)。
关键词
保险公司
机构投资者
企业创新
过度监督
Insurance Company
Institutional Investor
Corporate Innovation
Excessive Monitoring