基于创新激励框架的员工创新行为决策分析

Decision-making analysis of employees′innovation behaviors based on innovation incentive framework

本文运用博弈模型,在激励机制框架下分析了员工被动性和主动性创新行为的决策过程和绩效差异。假设两种创新行为的本质区别在于员工与企业博弈中的主导权不同,且主动性创新行为的创新效率高于被动性创新,探讨了创新效率、创新保留任务量、创新主体风险规避度对两种创新行为决策结果的影响,并从创新绩效以及经济收益的角度进行了对比分析。研究表明,被动性创新下,员工因创新保留任务量的降低可以得到额外的创新绩效,促使其创新行为由完全服从式向应付式转变;主动性创新下,员工投入的创新努力和创新绩效产出不一定和创新效率正相关,而应付式创新下则一定正相关;员工的理想创新绩效转化率越高,主动性创新行为实现的创新绩效和经济收益越有可能高于应付式创新,员工投入的创新努力则可能低于后者;如果两种创新行为的创新效率差距较小,企业和员工有可能均偏好于应付式创新,但前提是企业在应付式创新下设置的单位创新绩效激励强度高于主动性创新。当企业和员工决策偏好不一致时,员工创新行为的协调方向取决于哪种行为创造更大的创新总收益。

The advent of the era of the knowledge economy necessitates the internal innovation of emplyees in many enterprises.Employee innovation behavior is accompanied by a large amount of labor and intellectual cost,so the construction of an incentive mechanism is indispensable.There are two different kinds of employee innovation behaviors in modern organizations.One is the active innovation behavior which pursues freedom and foresight;the other is the passive innovation behavior which is mainly characterized by perfunctoriness and non-resource,and constrained by enterprise norms.It has been proved in practice that,under the incentive mechanisms,the decision-making process of two kinds of employee innovation behaviors is affected by multiple situational factors and therefore presents a complex internal action mechanism.The performance of active innovation behaviors may not be better than that of passive innovation.Most of the previous research focuses on the conceptual definition and dimensional representation of the two kinds of innovation behaviors,while they fail to model the decision-making process of the two kinds of innovation behaviors and make a quantitative comparison of their innovation performance differences.Based on the research framework of incentive mechanism,this paper carries out detailed analysis on innovation performance under active-passive innovation behavior by comprehensively adopting game theory,decision optimization theory,mathematical analysis method,computer simulation.First of all,assuming that the essential difference between the two innovation behaviors is that the employee and the enterprise have different dominant rights in the interests game,the paper establishes two models respectively,namely,the model of employee initiative innovation behavior decision and the model of employee passive innovation behavior decision constrained by task objective(tasks reserved).Secondly,the model is solved.According to the solution results,passive innovation behaviors are divided into two types,namely“compliant innovation”and“coping innovation”.The influence of situational factors on the outcomes of decision-makings further discussed,such as innovation efficiency,the quantity of innovation retention tasks,and the risk avoidance view of innovators.Thirdly,it makes a comprehensive comparative analysis of active-passive innovation behaviors from the perspectives of innovation effort input,innovation performance output,and economic income,and deeply explores the preferences of employees and enterprises for different innovation behaviors.Finally,it summarizes the enlightenments on how enterprises guide employees′innovation behaviors.The research shows that under passive innovation,too high goals and tasks set by enterprises will make employees have no motivation to create extra innovation performance and result in“obedient”innovation behavior.However,if the enterprise sets a low target task,employees will achieve higher innovation performance than the target task,forming a“perfunctory”innovation behavior which is slightly more active.By contrast,under active innovation,the innovation effort input and innovation performance output of employees are not necessarily positively correlated with innovation efficiency(conversion rate of innovation effort performance);while under perfunctory innovation,they are positively correlated.The higher the conversion rate of employees′ideal innovation effort performance is,the higher the innovation performance and economic benefit of active innovation likely to be than those of perfunctory innovation,also the lower the innovation effort invested by employees is.If the innovation efficiency gap between the two innovation behaviors is small,both the enterprise and the employee may prefer the perfunctory innovation.The premise is that the enterprise sets a high incentive strength of unit innovation performance under the perfunctory innovation.When the decision-making preferences of enterprises and employees are inconsistent,the coordination direction of employees′innovation behaviors depends on which behavior creates greater total innovation benefits.This paper provides some theoretical basis for enterprises to formulate effective innovation behavior guidance strategies under different situational factors.