“线上销售/回收+线下服务”的闭环供应链定价与服务决策

Pricing and Service Decisions in a Closed-loop Supply Chain with Online Sales/collection and Offline Services

对于"线上销售/回收+线下服务"的闭环供应链模式,研究了制造商在正向和逆向渠道中都与服务商进行收益共享情况下的最优销售/回收定价决策和最优服务水平决策,并比较了制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈、服务商领导的Stackelberg博弈、制造商与服务商Nash均衡博弈三种情形下的最优决策和最优利润。结果表明:最优的新产品销售价格和正向渠道服务水平均与正向渠道收益分成比例呈正相关;最优的废旧产品回收价格与逆向渠道收益分成比例呈负相关,而最优的逆向渠道服务水平与之呈正相关。制造商和服务商的最优利润不仅受正逆向渠道收益分成比例的影响,而且与新产品生产成本的大小有关:当新产品生产成本较小时,处于领导地位的一方获得的最优利润最大,而当新产品生产成本增大到一定程度后,对方处于领导地位时自身获得的最优利润反而最大,而双方均势时各自获得的最优利润均不占优。

With the rapid development of E-commerce, more and more manufacturers sell their products directly through online channels. Moreover, online channels have also great advantages in collecting used products. Many manufacturers have begun to collect used products online and remanufacture the returned products, which not only saves resources, but also improves enterprises’ social image. In this context, many manufacturers carry out online sales and collection, then remanufacture and resale the returned products, thus forming a closed-loop supply chain(CLSC). While the online sales/collection provides convenience to consumers, its offline service quality and efficiency have also become the key to its success. Therefore, more and more manufacturers choose to cooperate with professional offline service providers who offer consumers services such as product experience, distribution, return and maintenance, thereby forming a cooperative relationship between manufacturers’ online sales/collection and service providers’ offline services.In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain with online sales/collection and offline services is studied. The online manufacturer is responsible for product design, manufacturing, online direct selling, online collecting and remanufacturing, while the offline service provider, who can be a cooperative retailer or a third-party service provider designated by the manufacturer, takes charge of product experience and instruction, distribution, maintenance, and collection. A revenue-sharing mechanism is adopted between the manufacturer and the service provider in both forward and reverse channels. Then the manufacturer and service provider’s optimal decisions on sales/collection prices and service level are studied. And the optimal decisions and profits under different game structures are compared, i.e., the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader, the service provider is the Stackelberg leader, and Nash equilibrium game between the manufacturer and the service provider. Finally, the change of optimal profits with the cost of new product is studied through numerical analysis.The results show both the optimal sales price of new products and the optimal service level of forward channel are positively correlated with the revenue-sharing ratio of forward channel;the optimal collection price of used products is negatively correlated with the revenue-sharing ratio of reverse channel, while the optimal service level of reverse channel is positively correlated with it. In addition, the optimal profits of the manufacturer and the service provider are not only affected by the revenue-sharing ratios of forward and reverse channels, but related to the production cost of new products. The Stackelberg leader will get the most profit when the production cost of new products is small, while the non-leadership party will obtain the most profit the production cost of new products increases to a certain extent. When the two sides are in balance, the optimal profit of each side is not dominant.