混合所有制对企业避税的治理效应

Governance Effect of Mixed Ownership on Corporate Tax Avoidance

以2013年至2018年沪深A股上市公司为样本,实证研究混合所有制对企业避税的抑制作用及作用路径。研究发现:混合所有制可以发挥治理效应,通过提升企业内部控制水平和降低融资约束来抑制企业避税。无论国有企业还是非国有企业,混合所有制都能抑制企业避税;在国有企业中,混合所有制主要通过提升内部控制水平来抑制避税,而在非国有企业中,混合所有制主要通过降低融资约束来抑制避税;但是在控股股东绝对控股的企业,混合所有制抑制企业避税的作用显著降低。

Using A-shares companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen main board from 2013 to 2018 as samples, this paper empirically studies the inhibitory effect and action path of mixed ownership on corporate tax avoidance. The study finds that mixed ownership can play the governance effect and inhibit corporate tax avoidance by improving the level of internal control and reducing financing constraints. Mixed ownership can inhibit corporate tax avoidance in both state-owned and non-state-owned companies. In state-owned enterprises, mixed ownership mainly inhibits tax avoidance by improving the level of internal control, while in non-state-owned enterprises, mixed ownership mainly inhibits tax avoidance by reducing financing constraints. However, in the companies absolutely controlled by the controlling shareholder, the inhibitory effect of mixed ownership on corporate tax avoidance is significantly reduced.