“高门槛”与“弱激励”:大学教师聘任与评价制度的理性设计

The Rational Design of Appointment and Evaluation Systems of Faculty

分析法国、德国、美国三个国家的典型大学教师聘任与评价制度发现,在大学准入方面法国采用"标准化"制度,德国与美国采用"高门槛"制度;在职后评价方面三个国家都采取"弱激励"机制。用制度经济学理论分析"标准化"、"高门槛"两种筛选制度和"强激励"、"弱激励"两种激励机制的不同组合,发现"高门槛"与"弱激励"结合的大学教师聘任与评价制度更符合学术职业的本质要求和制度设计的理性规则。"高门槛"能很好地筛选出有志于且适合从事学术职业者,使教师队伍总体保持较高水平,"弱激励"可减少"学术内卷",激发学术活力与创造力,二者结合有利于保障教师队伍的纯洁性和学术工作的纯粹性,形成良好的学术生态。

Analyzing the faculty appointment and evaluation systems in France,Germany and the USA,it is found that the appointing mode is"standardized"in France while it follows the principle of"high threshold"in Germany and the USA;the on-the-job evaluations all follow the principle of"weak incentive".A theoretical analysis is conducted based on institutional economics.It is concluded that the faculty appointment and evaluation system with the combination of"high threshold"and"weak incentive"is more in line with the essential requirements of scholarship and the economic rationality of institutional designs."High threshold"helps to keep the overall quality of faculty at a high level,and"weak incentive"contributes to the restraint of academic involution and the trend of eager for quick success.Such combination is conducive to forming a long-term healthy academic ecology.