奖惩对建筑工人安全行为演化的正向效应研究

Study on the positive effect of rewards and punishments on the evolution of construction workers'safety behavior

为了探明奖惩对于建筑工人安全行为的影响,以演化博弈理论和成本收益理论为理论基础,构建监管者与建筑工人安全行为的动态博弈模型;然后,结合激励相容理论、理性选择理论、期望理论和强化理论,采用MATLAB模拟动态博弈过程和最大安全状态条件,并进一步通过调整博弈双方行为选择的成本和收益,研究奖惩对于建筑工人安全行为动态演化的正向效应;最后,通过案例分析奖惩对于建筑工人安全行为的影响。结果表明:工人和监管者都采取安全行为时才能达到最大安全状态;奖惩均对建筑工人安全行为演化产生正向影响,且奖励比惩罚的影响更显著;奖惩同时实施对建筑工人安全行为演化也有显著的正向影响。

This paper aims to explore the effect of rewards and punishments on the evolution of construction workers'safety behavior by employing game theory and the simulation method,to make up for the lack of rewards and punishments'research.In this paper,a dynamic game model of supervisors and construction workers is developed based on evolutionary game theory and cost-benefit theory.The model is used to simulate the process of the dynamic game between construction workers and supervisors and investigate the condition of the maximum safety state by using MATLAB software.Besides,the positive effect of rewards and punishments on the dynamic evolution of construction workers'safety behavior is also analyzed by adjusting the costs and benefits of a behavioral choice of both sides.Furthermore,a case study is adopted to analyze the impact of rewards and punishments on construction workers'safety behavior in practice.Results demonstrate that:(1)the maximum safety state in the game can only be reached when both workers and supervisors take safety behaviors.Namely,the subtraction of the reward from the cost of construction workers'safety behavior is less than the cost of unsafe behaviors,and the cost of supervisors'executing supervision behaviors is less than that of their nonsupervision behaviors.(2)with the increase of rewards and punishments,the ratio of construction workers'safety behavior gradually approaches one with the increase of game time,which suggests that both rewards and punishments have positive effects on the evolution of construction workers'safety behavior.(3)the influence of rewards on workers'safety behavior is found to be more significant than that of punishments by comparing the simulation results between adding rewards and punishments.(4)When rewards and punishments increase simultaneously,the proportion of construction workers'safety behavior gradually approaches one with the increase of game time.This result indicates that the simultaneous implementation of rewards and punishments also has a significant positive influence on the evolution of construction workers'safety behavior.