平台扼杀式并购的反垄断法规制

An Antitrust Analysis of Platform’s Killer Acquisitions

全球大型数字平台通过"复制、收购与扼杀"的策略扼杀并购了大量初创企业,引发了创新赛道垄断的顾虑。初创企业并购通常不会引起显著的市场结构变化,但随着时间推移,平台"切香肠式"的扼杀式并购,在扼杀潜在竞争对手、强化自身市场支配地位的同时,更会扭曲长期创新供给,致使未来市场可竞争性丧失。而并购效率改进收益的消亡、创业者奖励作用的证伪与动态竞争约束工具的全面失灵,进一步要求反垄断执法机构应摒弃目前普遍不作为的监管做法,及时识别与规制平台扼杀式并购。对此,有必要引入内部文档调查、并购价格组成分析等并购动机过滤机制,识别出那些出于消除未来竞争威胁或扼杀潜在迭代式创新目的的初创企业并购;同时,通过引入补充性的申报门槛、设定更具针对性的审查补救措施与授权必要的事后调查,将能有效地遏制平台资本的无序扩张,为初创企业创造一个不受主导平台扼杀式并购威胁的现代化营商环境。

Large global digital platforms merged many startups through the“acquire,copy or kill”strategy,raising potential antitrust concerns.Startups’acquisitions usually do not cause significant market structure changes.Nevertheless,over time,platforms’killer acquisitions will not only stifle potential competitors and strengthen their market dominance,but also distort long-term innovation,resulting in damage to future competition.The demise of natural monopoly effects,the failure of rewarding long-term innovation and the loose of dynamic competition constraints,suggest that the antitrust agencies should strengthen antitrust enforcement.Through investigating platforms’internal document and analyzing M&A price,the agencies could effectively identify those anti-competitive mergers.Finally,by introducing the transaction test in merger control,establishing more targeted remedies,and authorizing investigation of some consummated mergers,the agencies would be able to curb the platforms’disorderly expansion and protecting startups from being threatened by dominant platforms’killer acquisitions.