理事长利他精神与农民专业合作社发展——基于重庆市开州区田野调查案例的分析

Directors,Altruistic Spirit and Cooperative Performance:Theoretical and Empirical Analyses Based on Case Studies in Rural Chongqing

本文基于重庆市开州区4个典型农民专业合作社田野调查案例,对理事长利他精神影响合作社发展的机制进行了理论与案例分析。结果表明,农民专业合作社出现的“精英俘获”和“空壳社”现象与理事长的个人能力和利己行为密切相关。当理事长利己思想严重、个人能力较弱时,容易出现“空壳社”现象;当理事长利己思想严重、个人能力较强时,容易发生“精英俘获”问题;但如果理事长只具有利他精神而个人能力不足,就容易产生“低效合作社”;只有当理事长同时具有较强的个人能力和利他精神,能够有效平衡公平与效率时,才可能形成“理想合作社”。本文研究结果为我国完善理事长选拔、评价和监管机制,通过激发集体主义与利他精神,突破“委托-代理”问题,推动合作社产业稳定发展,带动广大农户增收致富,提供了重要的理论支撑与决策参考。

Based on the field investigation cases of four typical farmers’ professional cooperatives in Kaizhou District, Chongqing,this article conducts a theoretical and case analysis on the mechanism of the directors’ altruistic spirit affecting cooperative development. The results show that the phenomena of “elite capture” and “empty-shelled cooperatives” in farmers’ professional cooperatives are closely related to the directors’ personal ability and self-interest behavior. When the directors are less capable and selfish, the phenomenon of so-called “empty-shelled cooperatives” is easy to appear. When the directors are capable but selfish, the problem of “elite capture” is easy to occur. When the directors have an altruistic spirit and insufficient personal ability, it is easy to lead to a so-called “inefficient cooperative” phenomenon. Only when the directors are capable, altruistic and able to balance efficiency and fairness, can an “ideal cooperative” be formed. The research findings in this study provide important theoretical support and decision-making reference for China to improve the selection, evaluation and supervision mechanism of cooperative directors, stimulate collectivism and altruism, break through the “principle-agent” dilemma, promote the stable development of cooperativesand drive thevastnumberof farmersto increase their incomes.