摘要
针对MCN机构失信经营问题,考虑直播电商平台施行与消费者的合作监管和一般的普通监管两种方式下,构建直播电商平台、消费者、MCN机构的演化博弈模型,分析了三个主要主体的演化稳定策略,运用仿真分析验证博弈。研究结果发现:直播电商平台的合作监管对消费者激励机制和对MCN机构奖惩机制都能够影响MCN机构的经营行为。电商直播平台可提高与消费者合作监管成功率,制定合理的处罚、赔偿额度和对消费者激励降低MCN机构虚假经营的利润,可有效减少其虚假经营的动机。
In recent years, live e-commerce is in chaos, the strategy that live e-commerce platform cooperates with consumers to supervise MCN(Multi Channel Network) institutions is an effective measure to deal with the problems of low-quality goods and data fraud. Aiming at the problem of MCN organization’s dishonest operation, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of live broadcast e-commerce platform, consumers and MCN organization, analyzes the evolutionary stability strategies of the three main bodies, and uses simulation analysis to verify the game. The results show that: the cooperative supervision of the live e-commerce platform, the incentive mechanism for consumers and the reward and punishment mechanism for MCN institutions can affect the business behavior of MCN institutions. The e-commerce live broadcasting platform can improve the success rate of cooperative supervision with consumers, formulate reasonable punishment, compensation amount and incentive for consumers, reduce the profit of MCN institutions’ false operation, and effectively reduce the motivation of their false operation.
作者
刘芹
肖福明
LIU Qin;XIAO Fuming(School of Management,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China)
出处
《物流科技》
2022年第3期63-67,共5页
Logistics Sci-Tech
关键词
直播电商平台
消费者
MCN机构
演化博弈
live e-commerce platform
consumer
MCN institutions
evolutionary game