摘要
补贴效率是检验补贴制度设计合理性、运行有效性的核心标准。研究发现,我国通用航空飞行服务业补贴制度存在相对供给挤占、暂时性收益陷阱、恶性竞争和资金体内循环4类突出的效率损失及福利侵蚀问题,补贴对通航运营企业经营效益提升无显著影响。立足补贴效率受损形式并顺应有效供给和需求严重不足的产业发展矛盾,以社会福利和外部性为核心,从结构重塑、机制优化两个维度出发,全面建立我国通用航空飞行服务业补贴制度并探讨最优补贴边界,最大化补贴效益。首先,以需求二维影响机制为理论支撑,搭建“需求侧保险费率补贴制度+供给端弹性补贴计划”的双侧补贴模式,减缓有效供需规模偏小对企业短期非理性补贴行为的过度激化。其次,从调整补贴标准、丰富补贴层次、规范补贴流程、定位补贴属性4个方面着手深度优化供给侧补贴计划,并以应用事后补贴安排、筹建再保险补贴基金的形式细化需求侧补贴内容,以期最大程度减少补贴效率损耗对预期补贴福利的影响。
Subsidy efficiency is the core standard to test the rationality of subsidy system design and the effectiveness of its operation. It is found that there are problems of efficiency loss and welfare erosion in China’s general aviation service industry subsidy system,such as relative supply squeeze,temporary income trap,vicious loss operation and internal circulation of funds. Subsidies have no significant effect on business efficiency of general aviation companies. Based on the damaged form of subsidy efficiency and conforming to the contradiction between effective supply and demand,taking social welfare and externality as the core,starting from the two dimensions of structural remodeling and mechanism optimization,the subsidy system of China’s general aviation service industry was established and the optimal subsidy boundary was studied to maximize the subsidy benefits. Firstly,based on the two-dimensional influence mechanism of demand,a two-sided subsidy model of“demand side premium rate subsidy system + supply side flexible subsidy plan”was established to slow down the excessive intensification of short-term irrational subsidy behavior caused by the small effective supply and demand scale. Secondly,the supply side subsidy plan was deeply optimized from the following four aspects:adjusting the subsidy standard,enriching the subsidy level,standardizing the subsidy process and positioning the subsidy attribute,and refining the demand side subsidy content in the form of applying post subsidy arrangement and preparing to build reinsurance subsidy fund,so as to minimize the impairment of subsidy efficiency loss on the expected subsidy benefits.
作者
王国军
马倩
Wang Guojun;Ma Qian(School of Insurance,University of International Business and Economics,Beijing 100029,China)
出处
《技术经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第2期142-154,共13页
Journal of Technology Economics
基金
2020年国家留基委国内外联合培养博士研究生项目(CSC202006640053)。
关键词
补贴效率
暂时性收益陷阱
相对供给挤占
福利减损
补贴边界
subsidy efficiency
temporary income trap
crowding out effect
welfare impairment
subsidy boundary