碳税再循环分配效应演化博弈研究

Research on the Distribution Effect of Carbon Tax Recirculation Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

促进企业低碳生产和消费者绿色消费,是在社会经济高质量发展条件下实现碳达峰、碳中和目标的充分保障。构建由地方政府、企业和居民多主体构成的碳税再循环系统,结合当前中国国民收入水平和低碳经济发展状况,利用三方演化博弈理论研究多主体策略选择的演化过程,并应用Python程序设计语言对整个演化过程进行数值仿真,探究地方政府不同的补贴策略、产品的收入需求弹性和需求价格弹性等变量对碳税再循环分配效应的影响。研究结果表明:在低碳补贴和收入补贴策略之间,地方政府实施前者更能够促进居民绿色消费和企业低碳生产,但实施后者有利于改善收入不平等问题,同时产品的收入需求弹性和需求价格弹性差异也会影响地方政府碳税返还政策的效果。

Promoting low-carbon production of enterprises and green consumption of consumers is a sufficient guarantee to achieve the goal of carbon peak and carbon neutralization under the condition of high-quality social and economic development. A carbon tax recycling system composed of local governments,enterprises,and residents was constructed. Combined with the current level of national income and the development of the low-carbon economy in China,the evolution process of multi-agent strategy selection was studied by tripartite evolutionary game theory,and the whole evolution process was simulated by Python programming language. The influence of local government’s different subsidy strategies,product income demand elasticity,and demand price elasticity on the distribution effect of carbon tax recycling were explored. The results show that between low-carbon subsidy and income subsidy strategy,the former can promote residents’ green consumption and enterprises’ low-carbon production,but the latter can improve income inequality. At the same time,the differences in income demand elasticity and demand price elasticity will also affect the effect of local government carbon tax recycling policy.