倾向的外在论辩护

A Defense for the Extrinsic Dispositions Thesis

倾向是事物的内在性质,这是讨论倾向问题的哲学家们通常的理论假定。自从麦基特里克对内在倾向论题提出挑战以来,倾向主义者不断为内在倾向论题进行辩护,他们论证外在倾向可以还原为或奠基于内在倾向。但是,这些辩护都不成功。事实上,内在倾向论题之所以具有吸引力,主要在于对倾向的因果性和可能性两种理解,然而这两种理解都不能排除外在倾向的存在,甚至那些所谓典型的内在倾向实际上也是外在的。因此,外在倾向论题是值得辩护的,并且有着更广的应用范围:除了自然性质之外,几乎所有的倾向都是外在的。

That dispositions are intrinsic properties of objects, is a common assumption among philosophers who are engaged in the discussions of dispositions. However, since McKitrick raised the influenced challenge to the Intrinsic Dispositions Thesis, dispositionalists have been devoted to arguing that extrinsic dispositions can be reduced to or ground on intrinsic dispositions. Nevertheless, these attempts fail. The reason why the Intrinsic Dispositions Thesis is appealing lies on two kinds of accounts of dispositions, namely the causal account and the modal account. However, neither rejects the existence of extrinsic dispositions. This paper defends the Extrinsic Dispositions Thesis, and argues that almost all dispositions are extrinsic except natural properties.