斯特雷文斯解释还原的困境

The Predicament of Strevens’ Theory about Explanatory Reduction

多重实现性和解释的自主性对传统解释还原思想构成挑战。斯特雷文斯认为,虽然他的因果解释理论带有一种解释还原的思想,但他的理论却能克服多重实现性和解释的自主性对解释还原思想构成的挑战。但是,根据本文研究,斯特雷文斯的解释还原思想也不成功。根据他的观点,科学解释模型一定是聚合性的;但是,不仅聚合性的定义并非清楚明白,而且在科学实践中,我们也没有发现这种聚合性。另外,在斯特雷文斯看来,不可还原的性质不能进入解释的关键环节表述有两个理由:第一,只有个体的物理对象才能够进入解释的关键环节表述;第二,这是被科学实践所证实的。但是,根据本文研究,并非只有个体的微观物理对象才能够进入科学解释之中,斯特雷文斯的观点也并非符合科学实践,解释的多元主义要优于解释的一元主义。

Multiple realizability and explanatory autonomy pose challenges to explanatory reduction. Strevens claims that although his causal explanation theory has explanatory reduction, this theory is able to overcome the challenge of multiple realizability and explanatory autonomy. However, according to the study in this paper, Strevens’ idea of explanatory reduction is also unsuccessful. Scientific explanatory models must be cohesion;however, not only is the definition of cohesion not clearly understood, but we do not find such cohesion in scientific practice. Moreover, in Strevens’ view, there are two reasons why irreducible properties cannot enter the kairetic account of scientific explanation: first, only individual physical objects can enter the kairetic account of scientific explanation;second, this is confirmed by scientific practice. However, according to this paper, not only individual microphysical objects can enter into scientific explanation;Strevens’ view is not in accordance with scientific practice;the pluralism of explanation is better than the monism of explanation.