财政分权、政商关系和结构性产能过剩——基于2001-2011年中国工业面板数据和GMM的分析

Fiscal Decentralization,Government-Business Relationship and Structural Overcapacity:Based on Industrial Panel data in China from 2001 to 2011 and GMM

结构性产能过剩长期困扰中国工业部门,是供给侧结构性改革面临的突出问题。在中国财政分权的制度背景下,本文在“中央政府-地方政府-企业”三层博弈模型中刻画结构性产能过剩的形成机理,并利用2001-2011年中国工业面板数据和广义矩估计方法(GMM)检验财政分权对中国工业部门结构性产能过剩的影响机制。研究结果表明:财政分权对中国工业部门结构性产能过剩具有正向影响,并通过政商关系的渠道促使中国企业选择低端技术生产,进而导致中国工业部门结构性产能过剩。因此,为治理中国工业部门结构性产能过剩,中央政府应进一步推动体制改革、构建新型政商关系和促进企业技术创新。

Structural overcapacity has plagued China′s industrial sector for a long time,which is one of the prominent problems faced by the supply-side structural reform.Under the institutional background of fiscal decentralization in China,this paper describes the formation mechanism of structural overcapacity in the“Central Government-Local Government-Enterprises”three-tier game model,and uses the industrial panel data from 2001 to 2011 and the generalized moment estimation method(GMM)to test the effect and impact mechanism of fiscal decentralization on structural overcapacity.The results show that fiscal decentralization has a positive impact on structural overcapacity,and promotes enterprises to choose low-end technology production through the channels of government-business relationship,resulting in structural overcapacity.Therefore,in order to manage China′s structural overcapacity,the central government should further promote system reform,build new government-business relationship and promote enterprise technological innovation.