基于质量努力和管理努力的风险投资金融契约设计与学习机制

Design of Financial Contract and Learning Mechanism Based on Entrepreneurial Effort and Managerial Effort

在风险投资中,企业家付出的努力对企业的内在价值起决定性作用,为了研究如何更好地激励企业家提升企业的内在价值,本文将企业家付出的努力分为:质量努力和管理努力。首先,本文在单期静态模型下设计最优金融契约,并研究了两种努力的效率对激励效果的影响,研究表明:在单期模型中,激励企业家付出质量努力比激励其付出管理努力更加复杂,且与企业的内在价值波动有关。进一步,在多期动态模型中引入风险投资家对企业信息的学习过程,研究表明随着企业内在价值波动率单调减小,契约的激励效果越来越显著,且学习机制的加入会激励企业家降低努力的成本系数,同时更多地提升质量努力的效率。

In the venture capital,venture capitalists and entrepreneurs both improve the enterprise’s profit ability,but comprehensive existing literature,it is argued that studying how to motivate the entrepreneur pay human capital and effort is more important.In order to study how to motivate the entrepreneurs to improve enterprise’s intrinsic value,in this paper entrepreneurs’effort is divided into entrepreneurial effort and managerial effort.Firstly,the optimal financial contract is designed in the static single-period model,and the effect of two kinds of efforts efficiency on the incentive effect is analyzed.Studies have shown that,incenting entrepreneurs to pay the entrepreneurial effort is more complex than managerial effort,and related to the volatility of the quality of enterprises.Furthermore,venture capitalists’learning process of enterprise information is added into the dynamic multi-periods model.On the basis of considering the two efforts of entrepreneurs,the influence of learning mechanism on the incentive efficiency is explored in this model.The research shows that in this process,the volatility of the quality of enterprises decreases monotonously,and the incentive effect of contracts becomes more and more significant.Finally,based on the existing literature,parameter values are set and the actual salary level of entrepreneurs is studied with the numerical method.Studies have shown that the addition of learning mechanism will encourage entrepreneurs to reduce the cost coefficient of efforts and improve their entrepreneurial effort efficiency.The research of this paper gives guidance to the individual development direction of entrepreneurs and provides new ideas and theories for improving the governance efficiency of venture capital enterprises.