考虑政府激励的建筑劳务企业产业工人培育决策行为研究

Research on Decision-making Behavior of Industrial Workers'Cultivation in Construction Labor Service Enterprises Considering Government Incentives

以建筑劳务企业转型作为切入点,推进建筑产业工人培育,并基于利益相关者视角构建地方政府与建筑劳务企业之间的演化博弈模型。将地方政府激励成本与劳务企业转型成本作为重要研究参数,分析不同情形与重要参数变化下系统的演化趋势,并运用Matlab软件进行数值仿真。结果显示:只有当地方政府选择激励比不激励所获得的增量收益高于所付出成本,且企业主动转型比不转型所获得增量收益也高于所付出成本时,系统才会演化至(激励,转型)的理想状态;给予劳务企业适当的资金补贴及税收优惠、对“固步自封”企业采取适当负向激励措施有利于博弈系统实现最优均衡。

Taking the transformation of construction labor service enterprises as an entry point,this paper aims to promote the cultivation of construction industry workers,and an evolutionary game model between local government and construction labor service enterprises is constructed from the perspective of stakeholders.Taking the incentive cost of local government and the transformation cost of labor service enterprises as important research parameters,the evolution trend of the system under different situations and changes of important parameters is analyzed,and numerical simulation is carried out by Matlab software.The results show that the system will evolve to the ideal state(incentive,transformation)only when:a.the incremental income of the local government obtained by choosing incentive strategy than not choosing an incentive strategy is higher than the cost;b.the incremental income of the enterprises obtained by choosing transformation strategy than not choosing a transformation strategy is higher than the cost.The optimal equilibrium of the game system can be realized by giving appropriate financial subsidies and tax incentives to labor service enterprises and taking appropriate negative incentives to"stubborn"enterprises.