供应链金融信贷市场主体行为策略研究——基于政府干预下的演化博弈分析

Research on Behavior Strategy of Supply Chain Finance Credit Market:Based on an Evolutionary Game Analysis under Government Intervention

文章借助演化博弈工具,构建政府干预环境下核心企业、中小企业和金融机构之间的信贷三方博弈模型,并利用Matlab进行数值仿真,在动态演化中分析政府干预和系统内部因素对信贷三方博弈系统的影响。研究结果发现:博弈主体选择积极信贷策略的初始比例越高,系统演化至最优状态的概率越高;政府补贴对系统收敛至最优状态发挥较大的促进作用;政府惩罚可以调节演化速度,有维持信贷业务达成、系统稳定这一积极状态的趋势;提高中小企业还款比例将促进信贷业务的达成,降低准入成本、评估成本和监管成本均能有效促进系统收敛到最优状态。

With the help of evolutionary game tool, this paper constructs a credit tripartite game model among core enterprises,small and medium-sized enterprises and financial institutions under the environment of government intervention, and uses Matlab for numerical simulation to analyze the influence of government intervention and system internal factors on the credit tripartite game system in the dynamic evolution. The results show that the higher the initial proportion of players choosing the active credit strategy, the higher the probability of system evolution to the optimal state;Government subsidy plays an important role in promoting the system convergence to the optimal state. Government punishment can adjust the speed of evolution and has a positive trend of maintaining the credit business and system stability. Increasing the repayment ratio of SMEs will promote the achievement of credit business, and reducing the access cost, evaluation cost and supervision cost can effectively promote the system convergence to the optimal state.