资源型企业绿色转型监管三方演化博弈分析--基于规制治理与公众参与视角

Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Resource-based Enterprises'Green Transformation Supervision--From the Perspective of Regulation Governance and Public Participation

研究公众参与的资源型企业绿色转型监管对于我国经济高质量发展具有重要的理论和现实意义。本文基于公众和地方政府参与资源型企业绿色转型监管的囚徒困境模型,引入中央政府构建了三方非合作博弈模型,对模型的理想演化稳定均衡进行实证分析。研究结果表明,中央政府通过相关机制设计可以实现“中央施加压力、地方严格监督、公众积极参与”的资源型企业绿色转型监管局面,相关机制设计包括奖优、罚劣和加大环保督查3个方面,三者的作用具有互补性。在此基础上,从改革地方政府政绩考核制度、建立环境督查“回头看”的长效机制和完善公众参与监督机制等方面提出了相关政策和建议。

The research on public participation in the green transformation supervision of resource-based enterprises has im⁃portant theoretical and practical significance for the high-quality development of China's economy.Based on the prisoner's dilemma model of public and local governments participating in the green transformation supervision of resource-based enterprises,this paper introduces the central government to construct a tripartite non cooperative game model,and makes an empirical analysis on the ideal evolution and stable equilibrium of the model.The results show that the central government can realize the green transformation su⁃pervision situation of resource-based enterprises with“central pressure,local strict regulation and public active participation”through the relevant mechanism design.The relevant mechanism design includes three aspects:rewarding the excellent,punishing the poor and increasing environmental protection supervision.The three roles are complementary.On this basis,this paper puts for⁃ward relevant policies and suggestions from the aspects of reforming the performance evaluation system of local governments,estab⁃lishing a long-term mechanism of“looking back”of environmental supervision and improving the supervision mechanism of public participation.