企业并购中单边效应评估的经济学理论与实践

Economic Theory and Practice of Unilateral Effect Evaluation in Enterprise M&A

生产有差异的同类产品的企业之间进行横向并购时会因为企业规模扩大而产生单边效应。单边效应理论产生于中国反垄断法生效之前,该理论直接对传统反垄断经济学中相关市场界定的作用提出挑战。近年来,单边效应理论在各国反垄断实践中出现了不同程度的应用。由于单边效应评估采用了标准精确式的数量经济学分析而受到理论界的重视。政府反垄断部门在对企业并购申请进行审查时,根据市场结构可以建立支配企业模型、古诺模型或伯川德模型通过兼并模拟的方法评估集中可能带来的单边效应,并对三个模型的适用性进行了综合评价。以美国速食麦片行业的并购为例进行了模型选择和具体应用的介绍,并提供了实践操作中的具体数量方法。对企业并购申请审查需要考虑的影响因素包括:市场份额与市场集中度、竞争对手的生产能力和价格水平、潜在竞争者的能力、效率改进以及对破产厂商的保护等。

Horizontal M&A between enterprises producing similar products with differences will generate unilateral effects due to enterprise scale expansion.Unilateral effect theory has emerged before China’s anti-monopoly law came into force,and directly challenges the function of relevant market definition in traditional anti-monopoly economics.In recent years,unilateral effect theory has been applied to different degrees in various countries’anti-monopoly practice,and unilateral effect evaluation has attracted the attention of theoretical circles because it adopts the standard precise quantitative economic analysis.When examining the M&A applications,the government anti-monopoly departments can establish the dominant enterprise model,Cournot model or Bertrand model based on the market structure,evaluate the possible unilateral effects of concentration by means of merger simulation,and comprehensively evaluate the applicability of the three models.With the M&A of American instant cereal industry as an example,this study introduces the model selection and their specific application,and provides the specific quantitative methods in the practical operation.The influencing factors to be considered in the examination of enterprise M&A applications include market share and market concentration,competitors’production capacity and price level,potential competitors’ability,efficiency improvement and bankrupt manufacturer protection.