股权激励模式选择之谜——基于股东与激励对象之间的博弈分析

The Mystery of Choice of Equity Incentive Model:Based on the Game Theory Analysis between Shareholders and Top Executives

本文在我国业绩型股权激励条件的实践背景下,研究了上市公司股权激励模式的选择问题。基于股东与激励对象的利益诉求和博弈过程,通过引入博弈论分析框架,从股东占主导和管理层占主导两种情境入手,探讨博弈均衡下的激励模式选择成因。研究发现:(1)代理问题严重、投资风险较大、股价信息含量低的企业更倾向于选择限制性股票,原因在于具有行动次序优势的股东可以通过限制性股票更有效地促使激励对象努力工作;(2)高管权力大的企业也倾向于选择限制性股票,原因在于高管可以通过折价授予的限制性股票更大程度地谋取私利;(3)限制性股票既存在激励性又存在福利性,企业可以通过合理设置业绩考核条件发挥限制性股票的激励作用。本研究有助于在理论上厘清股权激励计划各参与方对激励模式选择的影响,并为优化股权激励制度提供借鉴。

The equity incentive plan can alleviate the principal-agent problem of enterprises,and it has gradually become a normal arrangement for Chinese listed enterprises to motivate and constrain agents since it was implemented in 2006.The design and effectiveness of the equity incentive model,as the core element of the equity incentive plan,is an important academic research topic and has been widely concerned by practical circles.From the practice of enterprises,restricted stocks have gradually replaced stock options and become the mainstream equity incentive model.This is not only contrary to the foreign literature which finds that stock options have stronger incentive than restricted stocks,but also contrary to the foreign practical experience of high proportion of stock options,presenting the puzzle of equity incentive model choice.Grounded on the institutional environment of equity incentives in China,this paper studies the choice of equity incentive model for Chinese listed enterprises in the practical context of performance-based equity incentive conditions.Considering the interest demands and game process of all participants of the equity incentive plan,this paper introduces the analysis framework of game theory on the basis of principal-agent theory and theory of executives’power,and discusses the choice of equity incentive model under the game equilibrium from perspectives of shareholder dominance and executive dominance.The theoretical model shows that in a shareholder-dominated scenario,restricted stocks are more likely to alleviate agency problems and become the preferred choice of shareholders to solve agency problems.Whereas,in a management-dominated scenario,restricted stocks bring greater benefits to executives and become the preferred choice of executives.Empirically,this paper takes the draft equity incentive plans of listed enterprises from 2006 to 2017 as the research sample to explore the factors influencing the choice of equity incentive model.The research finds that enterprises with serious agency problems,high investment risks and low stock price information are more inclined to choose restricted stocks,because restricted stocks can more effectively promote executives to work hard.Meanwhile,enterprises with powerful executives also tend to choose restricted stocks,because executives can seek personal gains to a greater extent through restricted stocks granted at a discount.In addition,the empirical test of incentive effect shows that restricted stocks can significantly improve corporate performance when the performance evaluation index is strict and the validity period is long,which is the incentive characteristic;while for the sample group with loose performance index and short validity period,restricted stocks significantly reduce corporate performance,showing typical welfare characteristics.The possible contributions and innovations of this paper are as follows.First,combined with the regulatory requirements of performance-based incentive conditions in China,this paper analyzes the“black box”of the choice of equity incentive model from the stakeholders’game perspective.By internalizing the requirements of external supervision into the behavioral strategies of participants,this paper restores the interaction process of all participants of equity incentive and constructs a game theory model to investigate reasons for the choice of equity incentive model in various situations,which enriches the research in this field.Second,restricted stocks are generally considered as a weak incentive in existing literature.This paper finds that restricted stocks have both incentive and welfare characteristics,and the rationality of performance appraisal goals is the key factor leading to the difference in incentive effects.This paper contributes to an objective evaluation of the effectiveness of equity incentives in practice in China,and also provides implications for the listed enterprises to enhance the incentive and weaken the welfare of equity incentive plans based on the setting of incentive conditions,and furthermore provides a reference basis for regulators to optimize the role of equity incentives in practice.