上市公司绩效困境与母公司减持行为关系研究

Research on the Relationship between Performance Dilemma of Listed Companies and Reduction Behavior of Parent Companies

以2014-2020年沪深两市制造业上市公司为研究样本,基于信号传递理论与委托代理理论,探究企业集团框架内上市公司绩效困境与母公司减持行为的关系及其权变性。研究发现:上市公司绩效困境对母公司减持行为具有正向影响,即上市公司绩效困境越严重,母公司越倾向于做出减持决策;母子公司高管联结可以弱化两者的正向关系,即母子公司高管联结程度越高,上市公司绩效困境激发的母公司股份减持倾向越弱;上市公司规模越大,母子公司高管联结对上市公司绩效困境与母公司减持行为关系的负向调节作用越强。通过对集团框架内委托人的行为动因和决策规律进行探索,验证了母子公司高管联结在集团框架中的治理作用,可以为实践中母子公司治理机制的完善和优化提供有益借鉴与启示。

Taking manufacturing listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2014 to 2020 as research samples,based on the signal transmission theory and principal-agent theory,this paper explores the relationship between the performance dilemma of listed companies and the reduction behavior of parent companies as well as its contingency within the framework of enterprise groups.The research finds:The listed company's performance dilemma has a positive impact on the parent company's reduction behavior,that is,the more serious the listed company's performance dilemma is,the more likely the parent company makes a reduction decision;The parent-subsidiary corporations executives'ties can weaken the positive impact between them,that is,the higher the parent-subsidiary corporations executives'ties,the weaker the tendency of reducing the shares of parent companies stimulated by the performance dilemma of listed companies;The larger the size of the listed company,the stronger the negative moderating effect of parent-subsidiary executives'ties on the relationship between the listed company's performance dilemma and the parent company's reduction behavior.This paper explores the behavior motivation and decision-making rules of the principal within the framework of the group and verifies the governance role of parent-subsidiary executives'ties in the group framework,which provides useful reference and enlightenment for the improvement and optimization of the governance mechanism of parent-subsidiary companies in practice.