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基于零售商公平关切的三级低碳供应链博弈研究 被引量:5

Three Level Low-carbon Supply Chain Game Study Based on Retailer's Fairness Concern
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摘要 运用博弈论和比较分析法,探讨公平关切对由政府、制造商和零售商组成的三级低碳供应链决策主体最优策略和效用水平的影响,并对公平关切前后供应链的均衡结果进行比较分析。研究结果表明,零售商的公平关切行为会增加政府低碳补贴额度,提高自身边际利润,降低制造商批发价;零售商的公平关切行为对其自身效用水平总是有利的;对政府的效用水平无影响;对制造商的效用水平总是不利的;零售商的公平关切行为并不总是有利于整个低碳供应链系统的效用最大化,取决于零售商公平利润标准与公平关切程度的大小。 By using game theory and comparative analysis,explore the impact of fairness concerns on the optimal strategy and utility level of the three-level low-carbon supply chain decision-making body composed of the government,manufacturers,and retailers,and makes a comparative analysis on the equilibrium results of supply chain before and after fairness concern.The results show that retailers'fair concern behavior will increase the government's low carbon subsidy amount,reduce the wholesale price of manufacturers,and improve their own marginal profit.Retailer's fair concern behavior is always beneficial to its own utility level;It's always bad for the utility level of the manufacturer;It has no effect on the level of government effectiveness;The retailer's fairness concern behavior is not always beneficial to the utility maximization of the whole low-carbon supply chain system,which depends on the retailer's fair profit standard and the degree of fairness concern.
作者 程浩楠 纪翔峰 CHENG Hao-nan;JI Xiang-feng(College of Business, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China)
机构地区 青岛大学商学院
出处 《青岛大学学报(自然科学版)》 CAS 2022年第1期102-111,共10页 Journal of Qingdao University(Natural Science Edition)
基金 国家自然科学基金(批准号:71801138)资助。
关键词 公平关切 均衡策略 效用水平 低碳供应链 fairness concern optimal strategies utility levels low-carbon supply chain
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