基于演化博弈模型的REITs激励对策研究

Research on REITs Incentive Countermeasures Based on Evolutionary Game Model

从地方政府的视角出发,构建REITs推广下的演化博弈模型,用演化稳定策略和复制动态方程的相关原理,分析国有企业与地方政府、房地产企业与地方政府之间的博弈关系,并用MATLAB软件对博弈结果进行数值仿真.研究结果表明:国有企业和房地产企业对REITs激励政策的反应有所不同,国有企业增量成本在一定范围内的变动会改变REITs的推广时间,不会对最终的博弈结果产生影响;房地产企业收益和增量成本的同样幅度变动会改变博弈的最终结果,使房地产企业参与REITs的意愿降低,最终导致REITs推广的失败.最后结合我国的现状,提出REITs推广过程中的对策建议.

From the perspective of local government,the evolutionary game model was set up by REITs promotion by adopting the related principles of the evolutionary stable strategy and replicated dynamic equation.This paper has analyzed the game relations between the state-owned enterprises and local government,and also between the real estate enterprises and local government.The game result numerical simulation is also carried out with MATLAB software.The results show that the responses of state-owned enterprises and real estate enterprises to REITs policy incentives are different.The changes in the incremental costs of state-owned enterprises within a certain range will change the promotion time of REITs,but will not have an impact on the final game results;The changes of real estate enterprises’income and incremental cost will change the final result of the game,reduce the willingness of real estate enterprises to participate in REITs,and ultimately lead to the failure of REITs promotion.Finally,by taking into account the current situation of our country,the countermeasures and suggestions in the process of REITs promotion are put forward.