税收分权、资源错配与全要素生产率

Tax Decentralization,Misallocation of Resource and Total Factor Productivity

对税收分权、资源错配与全要素生产率的关系进行理论梳理和实证检验,将税收分权分为增值税分成和企业所得税分成检验不同税种影响的差异。结果表明:随着官员考核压力的增大,税收分权会通过加剧对资本和劳动力等资源的错配,抑制技术进步,阻碍全要素生产率的提高,且资本错配这条路径的中介效应和受到的调节效应更加显著。受官员考核压力的调节,增值税分成和企业所得税分成均会加剧对资本和劳动力的错配,导致全要素生产率降低。相比较而言,企业所得税分成对全要素生产率的负向影响更大,增值税分成受官员考核压力的调节作用更大。

This paper analyzes the theoretical origin of and conducts empirical tests on the relationship between tax decentralization,resource mismatch and total factor productivity.At the same time,the impacts of different taxes are also tested,by subdividing tax decentralization into value-added tax sharing and enterprise income tax sharing.The results show that with increasing demand in assessment of officials,tax decentralization will inhibit technological progress and hinder the improvement of total factor productivity by aggravating the mismatch of resources such as capital and labor.Moreover,the intermediary and regulatory effects of capital mismatch are more significant.Regulated by the demand in assessment of officials,the share of value-added tax and enterprise income tax will exacerbate the mismatch between capital and labor,resulting in the reduction of total factor productivity.In comparison,the enterprise income tax share has a greater negative impact on total factor productivity,and the value-added tax share is more regulated by the demand in assessment of officials.