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Optimal Equilibrium Selection of Price-maker Agents in Performance-based Regulation Market 被引量:4

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摘要 This paper analyzes the oligopolistic equilibria of multiple price-maker agents in performance-based regulation(PBR)markets.In these markets,there are price-maker agents representing some frequency regulation(FR)providers and a number of independent price-taker FR providers.A model of equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints(EPECs)is employed in this paper to study the equilibria of a PBR market in the presence of price-maker agents and price-taker FR providers.Due to the incorporation of the FR providers’dynamics,the proposed model is reformulated as a mixed-integer linear programming(MILP)problem over innovative mathematical techniques.An optimal equilibrium point is also selected for the market,where none of the agents is the unique deviator and the dynamic performance of power system is improved simultaneously.The effectiveness of the proposed optimal equilibrium point is evaluated by comparing the outputs with the conventional optimal dispatches of the FR providers.
出处 《Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy》 SCIE EI CSCD 2022年第1期204-212,共9页 现代电力系统与清洁能源学报(英文)
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