考虑公众监督的政府与危险品运输企业的演化博弈分析

Analysis on Evolution Game of Government and Hazardous Materials Transportation Enterprise Under Public Supervision

为探讨公众监督对危险品运输行业监管的影响,构建一个演化博弈模型研究了政府和危险品运输企业的演化博弈策略。研究发现,公众参与程度和运输收益是影响危险品运输企业策略选择的决定因素。在危险品运输企业合法运输收益高于政府不监管时非法运输收益的情况下,若公众监督概率较低,企业与政府就会形成循环往复的对立策略;若公众监督概率是中等水平,企业趋向于非法运输;但随着公众监督概率的进一步提高,企业会转而选择合法运输。在危险品运输企业合法运输的收益低于非法运输的收益时,企业会选择非法运输策略,公众监督只能影响政府策略;此时,政府在加大行政惩罚力度的同时提高公众参与监督的概率才能取得很好的监管效果。

Aiming at exploring the influence of public supervision on the hazmats transportation industry,the evolution game strategies of government and hazmats transportation enterprises are studied by constructing an evolutionary game model.The research shows that the degree of public participation and the transportation profit are the determinant factors of the strategic choice of hazmats enterprises.In the case that the legal transportation revenue of the hazmat enterprise is higher,if the public supervision probability is low,the opposing strategy will be chosen by the government and the hazmat enterprise.And if the public supervision probability is in the middle level,the illegal transport policy will be chosen by the hazmat enterprise.However,as the public supervision probability is further increasing,the legal transport policy will be chosen.In the case that the legal transportation revenue of the hazmat enterprise is lower than the illegal one,the illegal transport policy will be chosen by the hazmat enterprise and the public supervision only affects the government policy.In this case,the great supervision effect can be improved when the government enhances the administrative punishment with a high probability of public supervision.