国有控股、高管激励与企业创新效率

State-Owned Holding,Executive Incentives and Innovation Efficiency of Enterprises

以2017~2020年我国A股上市公司为研究对象,探讨高管激励与企业创新效率之间的关系以及国有控股对二者关系的影响,实证结果显示:高管股权激励、高管薪酬激励均与企业创新效率显著正相关;国有控股在高管股权激励与企业创新效率之间发挥了正向调节作用,而在高管薪酬激励和企业创新效率之间则发挥了负向调节作用。因此,应注重优化和完善高管激励机制,在动态平衡高管风险承担水平与多样化利益需求中,合理配置股权与薪酬激励,以提升企业的创新效率;国有企业需结合自身特点,在薪酬激励基础之上加大股权激励力度,构建中国情景下创新导向型的高管激励机制。

This paper takes the A-share listed companies in China from 2017 to 2020 as the research object to discuss the relationship between executive incentive and enterprise innovation efficiency,as well as the influence of State-owned holding on the relationship.The results show that executive equity and compensation incentive have significant positive correlation with innovation efficiency.State-owned holding positively regulates the relationship between executive equity incentive and enterprise innovation efficiency,but plays a negative regulatory role between executive compensation incentive and enterprise innovation efficiency.Therefore,enterprises should pay attention to optimize and improve the incentive mechanism of senior managers,and reasonably allocate equity and salary incentives to improve the innovation efficiency in the dynamic balance of risk-taking level and diversified interest demand of senior managers.State-owned enterprises need to further consider their own characteristics and increase equity incentive on the basis of salary incentive to construct innovation oriented executive incentive mechanism of China.