无实际控制人与中小投资者保护——来自中国资本市场的经验证据

The Absence of Actual Controllers and its Effect on Minority Investor Protection:Empirical Evidence from China’s Capital Market

以2003—2019年的中国A股上市公司为样本,研究上市公司无实际控制人情景下的中小投资者保护问题,研究表明,相比上市公司有实际控制人,当上市公司无实际控制人时,这些公司更会通过资金占用与关联交易等方式来掏空上市公司,损害中小投资者利益,该结论在控制内生性后依然成立。进一步研究发现,股权制衡、管理层持股及法律环境和外部审计等能够抑制无实际控制人企业对中小投资者的利益侵害。此外,无实际控制人企业会存在更多的财务违规现象,公司业绩波动性也更大。研究发现有助于监管层加强对无实际控制人公司的监管。

This study examines the impact of the absence of actual controllers on minority investor protection by examining A-share listed companies from Shenzhen and Shanghai during 2003 to 2019.The analysis reveals that compared with listed companies with actual controllers,listed companies without actual controllers are more prone to tunnel firm through fund embezzlement and related transactions,thereby thwarting the interests of minority investors.This conclusion still holds after controlling for endogeneity.Further research reveals that the power balance in the shareholder structure,managerial shareholdings,legal environment,and external audit can inhibit the obstruction of the interests of minority investors in companies without actual controllers.Therefore,the regulatory authorities should strengthen supervision on listed companies without actual controllers,and listed companies should pay attention to the power balance in the shareholder structure to reduce the opportunistic behavior of larger shareholders.