“双积分”政策下汽车制造商生产和电池回收投资策略研究

Research on the Strategy of Manufacturers’Production and Battery Recycling Investment Under the Dual Credit Policy

在一个由新能源汽车制造商、传统能源汽车制造商和消费者三大主要参与者构成的市场中,建立考虑电池回收利用投资和异质消费者效用的Stackelberg博弈模型.求解了企业平均燃料消耗量积分不足、积分平衡和积分富裕三种情形下制造商的最优定价、产量,分析了政府的最优积分政策.研究表明:电池回收率和积分价格是影响新能源汽车和传统能源汽车最优价格与产量的两个关键因素;两个制造商的收益都随着电池回收率的增大而减小,但新能源汽车制造商的收益对电池回收率更敏感;动力电池回收利用生产者责任延伸制对新能源汽车产业发展的作用是双向的,一方面降低了新能源汽车单车收益,另一方面却增大了新能源汽车的需求.

Considering the market of three primary players,the new energy vehicle manufacturer,the traditional energy vehicle manufacturer and consumer,Stackelberg game model are formulated in which the battery recycling investment and heterogeneous consumers’utility are taken into accounts.In this paper,the optimal pricing and production for the manufacturer,the optimal credit policy decision for the government are analyzed under three different strategies including corporate average fuel consumption credit deficiency,credit balance and credit surplus.The results show that:1)The battery recycling rate and credit price are two key factors influencing the optimal price and production of new energy vehicles and traditional energy vehicles.2)The profit of both manufacturers decreases with the increase of battery recycling,but the profit of new energy vehicle manufacturers is more sensitive to battery recycling.3)The extended producer responsibility system for power battery recycling plays a two-way role in the development of the new energy vehicle industry.It reduces the profit of per new energy vehicle on the one hand,on the other hand,it increases the demand for new energy vehicle.