摘要
公民的道德动机问题是罗尔斯稳定性论证所关注的核心问题。面对休谟主义者对《正义论》中存在的个体道德动机不足问题的批评意见,在《政治自由主义》中,罗尔斯通过确立一种公民身份的理想给予公民行动理由以规范性。具体表现在,受到公民身份理想所规范的公民合情理性、理性的欲望会以不同的方式给出面向公共理性的道德动机。针对威廉斯的批评意见,本文认为威廉斯所定义的善观念是站在公民日常生活的立场给出的,而罗尔斯只关心公民政治生活中的首要善观念,所以就两者在善观念立场上的差异,威廉斯对于罗尔斯的批评是不成立的。
The moral motivation of citizens is the core of Rawls'argument about stability.In the face of the Humean's criticism on the lack of individual moral motivation in A Theory of Justice,Rawls normalized the reasons for citizens'actions by establishing an ideal of citizenship in Political Liberalism.Specifically,the reasonable rationality and rational desire of citizens regulated by the ideal of citizenship will give moral motives facing public rationality in different ways.In view of Williams'criticism,this paper argues that the concept of"Good"which defined by Williams is on the standpoint of citizens'ordinary life,while Rawls only cares about the primary concept of"Good"in citizens'political life.Therefore,Williams'criticism of Rawls is untenable on the basis of the difference in the standpoint of the concept of"Good".
作者
白彦
BAI Yan(School of Public Administration, Hunan Normal University, Changsha, Hunan 410081)
出处
《绵阳师范学院学报》
2022年第3期24-31,共8页
Journal of Mianyang Teachers' College
关键词
道德动机
公民身份
罗尔斯
威廉斯
moral motivation
identity of citizenship
Rawls
Williams