摘要
本文以行为决策权的获取和转移为视角构建博弈模型,将引发政府债务风险的政府和社会资本合作(PPP)财政支出行为的权利分别界定给政府和社会资本,构建并对比分析政府先行和社会资本先行的序贯博弈,及政府过度转移风险给社会资本的博弈模型。研究结果显示:一是现有制度短板提供了PPP项目财政支出责任债务风险的引致与分担的政社博弈空间。二是提升由不规范支出行为引发的交易费用是防控风险的关键,应构建财政支出的预算管理与合同管理的双重法律保障,优化政府监管。三是可引发政府和社会资本合谋违规的说服费用产生于综合制度环境,并非囿于单一项目的得失,应重视完善激励约束机制,加强配套制度建设。四是政府过度转移风险虽可在短期内降低财政支出责任,但随之产生的社会资本参与积极性下降、项目风险控制能力削弱和社会福利净损失等影响,将增加中长期财政支出责任债务风险。
This paper constructs the game model of government and social capital from the perspective of behavior rights’acquisition and transfer,defines decision-making rights of fiscal expenditure behaviors of public-private partnership(PPP)that incur government debt risks to government and social capital respectively,builds and compares the sequential game between“government as the first mover”and“social capital as the first mover”,and analyzes the game model of governments’excessive transfer risks to social capital.The results are shown as follows.Firstly,there are some problems in current institutional arrangements,which provide a probability of government and social capital game for the generation and sharing of government debt risks of PPP fiscal expenditure responsibilities.Secondly,the key to preventing and controlling debt risks is to raise transaction costs of non-compliant PPP fiscal expenditure behaviors,so it is important to construct a dual legal framework to ensure budget and contract management of PPP fiscal expenditure responsibilities to optimize government regulation.Thirdly,the persuasion cost that can lead to government and social capital collusion violations is generated in the comprehensive institutional environment,which is not limited to the gains and losses of a single project,so it is necessary to improve the incentive and restraint mechanism and strengthen the supporting systems.Fourthly,although governments’excessive transfer risks can reduce fiscal expenditure responsibilities in the short term,it can also reduce the initiative of social capital participation,weaken the risk control ability and cause the net loss of social welfare,which could increase debt risks for medium-and long-term PPP fiscal expenditures.
作者
吴昺兵
贾康
WU Bingbing;JIA Kang(University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190;China Academy of New Supply-side Economics,Beijing 100071;Chinese Academy of Fiscal Sciences,Beijing 100142)
出处
《经济与管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第2期30-47,共18页
Research on Economics and Management
基金
国家自然科学基金专项项目“国家宏观战略中的关键问题研究”之支持项目“PPP基础性制度建设研究”(71950009)。
关键词
PPP项目
财政支出责任
政府债务风险
风险防控制度
序贯博弈
交易费用
public-private partnership(PPP)project
fiscal expenditure responsibilities
government debt risk
risk prevention and control institutions
sequential game
transaction costs