基于三方演化博弈的PPP项目运营期诚信机制构建研究

The Construction of Honesty Mechanism of PPP Project in Operation Period Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game

PPP项目迈入规范发展阶段,PPP项目运营期诚信机制构建问题亟待解决.文章通过构建政府、社会资本及公众三方在PPP项目运营期内的演化博弈模型,分析了三方策略选择的相互作用,通过三方演化博弈均衡点求解及稳定性分析逆推得出构建运营期诚信机制所需满足的三方收益成本设置条件.运用MATLAB仿真验证了参数设置的合理性,并分析了三方对重要参数的敏感性.理论计算及仿真结果均表明,理想的演化稳定策略并非总能达成,一旦社会资本稳定地趋向“守信”,且政府保持“积极监管”策略,公众会立刻“置身事外”,不再采取积极监督策略.在仿真基础上结合内外因机理分析,提出从奖惩互补、再谈判、声誉、价格、法律及公众参与6个方面构建PPP项目运营期诚信机制.

PPP project has entered the normative developing phase, and the construction of honesty mechanism of PPP project in operating period urgently needs to be solved.By constructing the evolutionary game model of the government, private capital and the public during the operation period of PPP project, this paper analyses the interaction of the tripartite game participants’ strategy choices.The parameter’s setting conditions of tripartite income and cost which is necessary for construction of honesty mechanism are obtained by solving the equilibrium points of tripartite evolutionary game and backward induction of stability analysis.The rationality of parameter setting and the influences of some important parameters are verified by MATLAB simulation.Theoretical calculation and simulation results all show that the ideal evolutionary stable strategy can not always be achieved.Once the social capital tends to be “Keeping promises” and the government maintains the “Active supervision” strategy, the public will immediately choose “Keeping out of the affair” and no longer take the active supervision and exposure strategy.On this basis, by the combination of mechanism of internal and external factors, this paper proposes to construct the honesty mechanism of PPP project in operation period from six aspects: complimentary rewards and punishment, renegotiation, reputation, price, law and public participation.