政府审计对国有企业金融资产配置的影响研究

Research on the Impact of Government Audit on the Allocation of State-Owned Enterprise Financial Assets

为了探讨政府审计监督对国有企业金融资产配置问题的影响机制与效应,将政府审计的实施作为一个"天然"的准自然实验窗口,以我国2008~2018年沪深两市A股非金融类中央国有上市公司为样本,构建多期双重差分(DID)模型进行实证检验。研究表明,政府审计的实施显著抑制了中央国有上市公司的金融化,特别是隐性金融资产配置。依据国家审计署公开发布的审计结果公告进一步研究发现:政府审计的专业性和目的性、执行频次和揭示力度,以及整改回应性越强,政府审计抑制作用的效果越好;同时,注册会计师审计与政府审计之间具有互补性。

In order to explore the impact mechanism and effect of government audit supervision on the financial asset allocation of state-owned enterprises,the implementation of the government audit is taken as a “natural” quasi-natural experimental window,and a multi-stage difference-in-differences model is constructed for the empirical test based on the sample of A-share non-financial central state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2018.This study shows that the implementation of government audit significantly inhibits the financialization of central state-owned enterprises,especially the allocation of hidden financial assets.Through further analysis of the audit announcement publicly issued by the National Audit Office,it is found that the stronger the professionalism and purpose of the government audit,the frequency of implementation and disclosure,and the response to rectification,the better the inhibitory effect of the government audit.At the same time,there is complementarity between CPA audit and government audit.