双重股权结构如何影响审计定价?——基于在美中概股的实证研究

How Does Dual-class Share Structure Affect Audit Pricing?An Empirical Study Based on US-listed Chinese Concept Stocks

在科创板允许特殊表决权企业上市以及美国强化中概股公司审计监管的背景下,基于2005—2019年在美上市中概股公司数据,实证研究双重股权结构对审计定价的影响及其作用环境。研究发现,相较于单一股权结构,双重股权结构会显著提高审计定价;同时发现,在双重股权结构下,投票权和现金流权之间的分离程度与审计定价之间呈显著正相关关系。在控制内生性问题后,上述结论仍然成立。进一步研究发现,相较于其他双重股权结构公司,在经理人纵向兼任、低市场化程度地区的双重股权结构公司中,投票权和现金流权之间的分离程度对审计定价的提升作用更为显著。研究结论为双重股权结构的治理及监管提供了有益的经验参考和理论指导。

In the context of the STAR market allowing the listing of companies with dual-class share structure and the strengthening of US regulation of Chinese companies listed in the US,this article takes the Chinese concept stock companies listed in the United States from 2005 to 2019 as a sample to empirically test the impact of dual-class share structure on audit pricing and the environment in which it works.The empirical results find that dual-class share structures significantly increase audit pricing compared to single equity structures;it also finds a significant positive relationship between the degree of separation between voting rights and cash flow rights and audit pricing under a dual-class share structure.The above findings still hold true after controlling for endogeneity issues.Further research finds that the degree of separation between voting and cash flow rights has a more significant effect on audit pricing in dual shareholding structure companies with affiliated managers and located in less marketable regions than in other dual shareholding structure companies.These findings provide useful empirical references and theoretical guidance for the governance and regulation of dual-class share structures.