中国式分权与土地征收:理论及实证

Chinese Style Decentralization and Land Acquisition:Theory and Empirical Evidence

在构建土地征收决策动态最优化理论模型的基础上,基于2004—2017年的省级数据,采用动态面板模型进行了实证分析。研究发现:无论是财政收入分权还是财政支出分权,其对土地征收均具有显著的正向影响,而且这种影响十分稳健;财政压力在土地征收的决定机制中也发挥着重要作用;中央政府的征地行为与地方政府的征地行为存在明显的差异性,地方政府在征地中具有更强的路径依赖性,而中央政府的征地行为因存在多重目标而呈现出一定的反路径依赖性;东部地区与中西部地区的征地在路径依赖性方面也存在较大的差异。

Based on the dynamic optimization theoretical model of land acquisition decision-making, this paper used the provincial data from 2004 to 2017 to conduct an empirical analysis by applying dynamic panel model. Empirical results showed that both fiscal revenue decentralization and fiscal expenditure decentralization had a significant positive impact on land acquisition, and the effects were extremely robust. Besides, financial pressure also played an important role in the decision-making mechanism of land expropriation. Moreover, land acquisition behaviors of the central government were different from that of local governments. The land acquisition behaviors of local government exhibited the obvious characteristic of path dependence. However, the central government may consider multiple objectives in the process of land acquisition, and exhibit certain characteristic of reverse path dependence.Meanwhile, the land acquisition behaviors in eastern region and that in central and western regions were also quite different in the aspect of path dependence.