信号效应、政府补贴与融资约束

Signaling Effects,Government Subsidies and Financing Constraints

中国经济转型背景下的融资约束已成为企业不可回避的问题。政府补贴被视为国家经济宏观调控中“一双有形的手”,在对政府补贴与融资约束关系的分析中其信号效应常被忽视。选用2012—2019年沪深A股上市公司为样本,使用现金—现金流敏感度模型,探讨分析信号效应、政府补贴与融资约束之间的关系。实证结果表明,政府补贴可以缓解外部投资者与企业之间的信息不对称,具备信号效应;政府补贴及其信号效应对于企业的融资约束有调节作用;进一步结合不同背景条件的异质性分析发现,对于民营企业、非制造业行业、西部地区企业,政府补贴释放的信号效应对企业融资约束的影响更为显著。

Financing constraint is an unavoidable problem for enterprises under the background of China’s economic transformation.Government subsidies are regarded as a’pair of visible hands’in the national economic macro-control.In the analysis of the relationship between government subsidies and financing constraints,government subsidies’signal effect is often ignored.This paper selects Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2019 as research data samples.It discusses and analyzes the relationship between signal effect,government subsidies and financing constraints by using the cash-cash flow sensitivity model.The results show that government subsidies can alleviate the information asymmetry between external investors and enterprises,which has a signal effect.The government subsidies and its signal effect can regulate the enterprises’financing constraints.Further combining with different background conditions in heterogeneous analysis,the research finds that private enterprises,non-manufacturing industries and enterprises in western China,the signal effect released by government subsidies has a more significant impact on the financing constraints.