IPO与企业创新投资策略的博弈分析——基于股价信息视角

Game Analysis of IPO and Enterprise Innovation Investment Strategy——Based on the Perspective of Stock Price Information

基于股价信息视角,构建IPO与企业创新投资决策博弈模型。以2007-2019年期间A股上市企业为研究样本,运用双向固定效应模型实证检验了IPO对企业技术创新投资决策的影响。结果表明,IPO后企业的创新投资和投资收益均有所下降。随着企业自身股价信息的增加,企业的创新投资-股价信息敏感性下降;而同行企业股价信息的增加增强了企业创新投资对同行企业股价信息的敏感性。进一步发现,IPO后企业的创新投资-同行企业股价信息敏感性增加,同行企业股价信息的增加增强了企业创新投资与IPO二者间的关系。

Based on the perspective of stock price information, this paper constructs a Game model of IPO and enterprise innovation investment strategies. Taking A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2019 as a research sample, this paper uses the two-way fixed effects model to empirically test the impact of IPOs on enterprises innovation investment. Result shows that after the IPO, the innovation investment and investment income of enterprises have declined. With the increase of enterprise stock price information, the sensitivity of the enterprise innovation investment to its own stock price information decreases. While the increase of the peers′ stock price information strengthens the sensitivity of the enterprise′s innovation investment to its peers′ stock price information. Further, after IPO, the enterprise innovation investment has become more sensitive to its peers′ stock price information. The increase in the peers′ stock price information strengthens the relationship between enterprise innovation investment and IPO.