资源型企业绿色转型监察监管三方演化博弈及稳定性控制策略

Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Stability Control Strategy of Resource-based Enterprises′ Green Transformation Supervision

通过构建国家、地方和企业三方监察监管演化博弈模型,结合系统动力学仿真手段进行模型求解和稳定性控制研究。结果表明:(1)当前我国资源型企业绿色转型监察监管系统不存在演化均衡策略,完全静态奖罚方案显露出国家和地方政府部门监察与监管体制僵化的弊端,是绿色转型监察监管低效率的重要原因。(2)非线性激励的动态奖罚方案能够促进系统波动演化趋向稳定,并达到理想状态,即国家和地方政府部门能够以较低的投入与成本施行有效的监察与监管,绿色转型成为资源型企业的最优策略。

By constructing a tripartite supervision Evolutionary Game model that includes the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, local Ecology and Environment Departments(bureaus) and resource-based enterprises, system dynamics simulation method is used for model solving and stability control research in this paper. Results show that, at present, there is no evolutionary equilibrium strategy in the green transformation supervision system of resource-based enterprises in China, and the completely static reward and punishment scheme reveals the disadvantages of the rigid supervision system, which is an important reason for the inefficiency of the green transition supervision. The dynamic reward and punishment scheme that includes nonlinear incentives can promote the stable evolution and reach the ideal state of the system, that is, the national and local government departments can implement effective supervision with lower investment and cost, and green transformation becomes the optimal strategy for resource-based enterprises.